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NOT SO GOOD: THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
“SMART GOODS” UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2 
Chadwick L. Williams* 
INTRODUCTION 
Refrigerators can now tweet.1 Today, almost sixty years after the 
states widely adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the line 
between goods and services is more blurred than ever.2 When the 
UCC was drafted, a good was the simple opposite of a service.3 A 
good was something “movable” and tangible,4 and a service was not.5 
Article 2 of the UCC, which governs sales, limits its scope to goods.6 
However, because Article 2 was drafted long before the proliferation 
of so-called “smart goods,”7 courts continuously struggle to 
determine when a smart good falls within Article 2’s scope.8 Courts 
have developed different tests over the years to deal with contracts 
                                                                                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Mark 
Budnitz for helping me develop this topic and Professor Corneill Stephens for fostering my interest in 
contracts and the UCC. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Kayla and my family for their constant 
support and encouragement throughout this process. Finally, thank you to all the members of Georgia 
State’s Law Review who helped review and edit this Note. 
 1. Sam Byford, Tweet My Fridge: The Bizarre Home Appliances of CES, THE VERGE (Jan. 16, 
2013, 9:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/16/3867932/evernote-on-your-fridge-ces-home-
appliance-insanity [https://perma.cc/VT8K-364R]. 
 2. Lee Kissman, Revised Article 2 and Mixed Goods/Information Transactions: Implications for 
Courts, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561, 571 (2004) (“[B]ecause emerging technologies have become 
increasingly intertwined, some authors point out that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a clear 
distinction between embedded and non-embedded software, even for computer scientists.”). 
 3. See Eric Goldman, UCC 2B/UCITA Resurrected–ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software 
Contracts, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (June 1, 2007), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/06/ucc_2bucita_res.htm [https://perma.cc/TTU7-KBFK]. 
Law professor Eric Goldman writes that because Article 2 was principally drafted in the 1950s, it was 
designed to “govern the sale of tangible items, not software . . . . Accordingly, Article 2 fits awkwardly 
when applied to ‘intangible goods’ like software.” Id.; U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1977). 
 4. U.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
 5. U.C.C. § 2-102. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Goldman, supra note 3. 
 8. See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and Your Car Dials 911 
After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 241, 242 (2002). 
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containing a mixture of goods and services,9 but those tests produce 
questionable results when applied to smart goods.10 In the late 1990s, 
drafters attempted to address these issues with an ill-fated addition to 
Article 2 that ultimately failed.11 Still today, as software and tangible 
goods become more intertwined,12 software’s legal status remains a 
fundamental, yet unanswered, question.13 This unresolved question 
impacts consumers directly;14 whether a contract falls within the 
scope of Article 2 affects customers’ available warranties and 
remedies.15 
The following Note discusses the classification difficulties posed 
by modern goods with embedded software and services. Part I 
explains the history of the UCC, the past efforts to address the 
difficulties, and the issues that still remain. Part II analyzes previous 
attempts to resolve the issue and courts’ current solutions to these 
classification difficulties. Part III proposes a contemporary solution 
to these modern challenges and discusses how such a solution might 
be implemented. 
I.   Background 
In the early 1940s, two organizations, the National Conference of 
Commissioners and the American Law Institute (ALI), joined 
together to develop a comprehensive body of law to govern 
commercial transactions.16 This commercial code embraced all 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See YVONNE W. ROSMARIN & JONATHAN SHELDON, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 158–64 
(2d ed. 1989). 
 10. Spencer Gottlieb, Installation Failure: How the Predominant Purpose Test Has Perpetuated 
Software’s Uncertain Legal Status Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 113 MICH. L. REV. 739, 741 
(2015); Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge that UCC Article 2 Does Not 
Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 555 (2011). 
 11. See Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 168 (Fall 2001); William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong, 
11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 131, 135 (2009); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 
1011–12 (2002). 
 12. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 13. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
 14. Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United States, 12 INT’L. & COMP. 
L.Q. 226, 234 (1963). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 229. 
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modern developments in other attempted uniform sales codes17 and 
created new provisions to address recognized commercial 
problems.18 If adopted by the states, this collection was intended to 
replace the common law of contracts for commercial transactions.19 
This collection was the UCC.20 Following its initial introduction, the 
UCC went through many drafts and redrafts.21 Finally, after years of 
debate and revision,22 the official edition of the UCC was published 
in October 1952.23 By 1967, forty-nine states had adopted the UCC 
to some degree.24 
With the states’ mass adoption of the UCC,25 the UCC preempted 
the common law of contracts whenever the UCC applied.26 Article 2 
of the Code applies to the sale of goods.27 A “good” is defined as “all 
things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable 
at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . .”28 Therefore, 
Article 2 governs the enforcement of any contract concerning 
tangible “things” which are “movable.”29 The application of Article 2 
is simple when the contract in controversy exclusively concerns 
goods. However, contracts are often mixed, with services and goods 
intertwined within the agreement.30 The Code is silent on the 
treatment of mixed goods and service contracts;31 these “hybrid 
contracts” have troubled courts since the adoption of the UCC.32 To 
deal with this issue, courts have developed several different tests.33 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 230. 
 24. William B. Davenport, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey-1967, 22 BUS. LAW. 707, 707 
(1966). 
 25. Id. 
 26. AmSouth Bank v. Tice, 923 So.2d 1060, 1065 (Ala. 2005). 
 27. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 28. U.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–64. 
 31. See id. at 159. 
 32. See id. at 158–64. 
 33. Id. at 158. 
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A.   The Hybrid Tests 
The primary issue courts face with hybrid contracts is determining 
whether Article 2 applies,34 and, if so, how much of the contract falls 
within the Article 2 scope.35 The test used differs by jurisdiction.36 
1.   The Predominant Factor Test 
A majority of jurisdictions use the predominant factor test to 
resolve hybrid contract scope issues.37 Even if a contract contains a 
mixture of goods and services, if its “predominant factor, [its] thrust, 
[its] purpose, reasonably stated, is . . . a transaction of sale,” then 
Article 2 of the UCC applies.38 Once the court determines the 
“predominant purpose” of the contract, either the whole contract is 
governed by Article 2 or none of it is.39 
Courts analyze several factors to determine if a hybrid contract’s 
“thrust” and “purpose” are truly a sale of goods.40 The factors are (1) 
the language of the contract; (2) the manner of billing; (3) the 
allocation of costs; and (4) the nature of the final delivered product.41 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Towle, supra note 10, at 555. 
 35. See Ann Lousin, Cases on the Scope of Article 2, 46 BUS. LAW. 1855, 1861–66 (1991). 
 36. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 159. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a bowling alley’s contract 
with a bowling equipment dealer for bowling equipment, installation, and lane resurfacing was 
predominantly a sale of goods). 
 39. Id. at 959. 
 40. Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ind. 1993) 
(“Specifically, one looks to the terms describing the performance required of the parties, and the words 
used to describe the relationship between the parties.”). 
 41. BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). The court stated: 
Courts are frequently faced . . . with contracts involving both goods and 
services—so-called “hybrid” contracts. Most courts follow the 
“predominant factor” test to determine whether such hybrid contracts are 
transactions in goods, and therefore covered by the UCC, or transactions in 
services, and therefore excluded . . . . Under this test, the court determines 
whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably 
stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., 
contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor 
incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a 
bathroom) . . . . Although courts generally have not found any single factor 
determinative in classifying a hybrid contract as one for goods or services, 
courts find several aspects of a contract particularly significant. First, the 
language of the contract itself provides insight into whether the parties 
4
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First, if the contract contains language like “purchase order,” then 
courts consider that contractual language to be more indicative of an 
Article 2 transaction in goods.42 Second, if the contract mandates a 
lump sum payment at delivery, that language is more indicative of a 
contract for goods than services.43 Third, it is more indicative of a 
contract for goods if most of the costs are in exchange for the 
tangible portion of the contract.44 Finally, if the final product 
delivered is movable and tangible, the contract would likely fall 
within the scope of Article 2.45 
                                                                                                                 
believed the goods or services were the more important element of their 
agreement. Contractual language that refers to the transaction as a 
“purchase,” for example, or identifies the parties as the “buyer” and 
“seller,” indicates that the transaction is for goods rather than services . . . . 
Courts also examine the manner in which the transaction was billed; when 
the contract price does not include the cost of services, or the charge for 
goods exceeds that for services, the contract is more likely to be for 
goods . . . . Movable goods is another hallmark of a contract for goods 
rather than services. The UCC’s definition of goods makes clear the 
importance of mobility in determining whether a contract is for goods . . . . 
Id. at 1329–30. 
 42. Id. at 1330–31. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1330. Even among the courts that apply the same test, results often conflict. One court 
applying the predominant factor test stated: 
There was no proof of defective goods. There was, however, proof of 
defective services performed in relation to the goods. The warranty 
provisions of [the UCC] apply to services when the sale is primarily one of 
goods and services are necessary to insure that those goods are 
merchantable and fit for the ordinary purpose. [Therefore, Article 2 applies 
to the sale and installation of a swimming pool.] 
Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Ky. 1977). Another court, however, held the opposite concerning 
a very similar transaction, stating: 
The initial terms of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant 
provided merely that the defendant would “furnish all labor and 
materials . . . and to construct pool . . . furnish and install swimming pool 
with vinyl liner. Complete with built in fence and stairs” . . . . In the present 
case it is obviously impossible, or extremely difficult to effect a separation 
of the labor or services from the material and equipment. The two 
component parts do not readily permit that cleavage. [Therefore, Article 2 
does not apply to the sale and installation of a swimming pool.] 
Gulash v. Stylarama, 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 112–13 (1975). Unfortunately, this is the result of a balancing 
test; it gives the court more discretion than it would ordinarily have with a firm rule. Some 
commentators, however, claim that courts selectively choose factors that lead them to apply the UCC, 
particularly in consumer contracts, seeking to protect the consumer with the implied remedies provided 
by the Code. Alternatively, the conflicting results may simply result from different courts prioritizing 
the factors differently. 
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2.   The Gravamen Test 
The gravamen test is a simpler alternative to the predominant 
factor test.46 Under this test, the court looks at the entire contract in 
the context of the facts and circumstances of the case.47 If the hybrid 
contract, in light of the dispute, seems like its essence was for the 
sale of a good, then Article 2 applies.48 If the contract, in light of the 
dispute, seems like it was actually for the contracting of services with 
some goods implicated, Article 2 does not apply.49 In the gravamen 
test, like the predominant factor test, either all of the contract is 
                                                                                                                 
  One court prioritizing contract language stated: “The language thus employed is that peculiar to 
goods, not services. It speaks of ‘equipment,’ and of lanes free from ‘defects in workmanship and 
materials.’ The rendition of services does not comport with such terminology.” Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 
F.2d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 1974). Another court, prioritizing manner of billing, stated: “Although [the 
original contract] included some service trips for inspection, startup, instruction of plant personnel, and 
observation, the contract was predominantly for the supply of equipment. The later communications 
from [the party] specifically noted that most service items would be in addition to the contract price.” 
WesTech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constr., Inc. 835 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Yet another 
court, prioritizing allocation of costs, stated: “The projected total, excluding bonus, is therefore 
approximately $59,828, of which [over 90% is allocated to] labor . . . . Based on this evidence, we 
conclude that this was primarily a service contract.” Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 
161 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
 46. J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So.2d 396, 400 (Miss. 1996). In a case 
regarding cabinets, the court held that the UCC did not apply because the dispute involved the service 
aspect (disposing of cabinets) of the contract rather than the goods aspect (the new cabinets). Id. The 
court stated: 
It is very often the case that a construction contract will involve the 
furnishing of goods by a subcontractor, and this Court holds that, in such a 
mixed transaction, whether or not the contract should be interpreted under 
the UCC or our general contract law should depend upon the nature of the 
contract and also upon whether the dispute in question primarily concerns 
the goods furnished or the services rendered under the contract. The present 
case clearly does not concern the cabinets manufactured, but rather the 
refusal of [one party] to assume duties which [the other party] contractually 
obligated itself to perform. This Court would not hesitate to apply Article 2 
if the present case involved, for example, a dispute of the quality of the 
cabinets, but the present case is in actuality a fairly standard contract 
dispute involving delegation of duties under a contract and the right to 
unilaterally rescind said contract. The fact that goods were furnished in the 
present contract has no bearing on the legal analysis involved, given that 
the dispute in this case clearly concerns the service aspect of this mixed 
transaction. 
Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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governed by Article 2 or none of it is.50 Although the majority of 
courts use the predominant factor test, courts remain divided on 
which test best applies Article 2 to contracts only partially within its 
scope.51 
B.   The Life and Death of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act 
Contracts for the sale of software challenged the courts even more 
than the hybrid contracts that came before.52 A few decades after the 
wide adoption of Article 2 marked the dawn of the computer age.53 
Courts attempted to apply the same hybrid tests to contracts for the 
sale of software.54 Results varied greatly.55 Although software was 
technically tangible and movable in compact disc form, the true 
essence of a contract for software was for the information on the 
tangible disc.56 Courts continue to struggle to consistently apply the 
traditional hybrid tests to software contracts.57 
In 1999, recognizing the widespread confusion software was 
causing,58 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and the ALI promulgated the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) to govern transactions in 
computer information.59 The UCITA initially began as a proposal for 
an addition to the UCC, which would be known as Article 2B.60 
                                                                                                                 
 50. J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc., 683 So.2d at 400. 
 51. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 161. 
 52. Goldman, supra note 3. 
 53. See Erik Sandberg-Diment, Personal Computers; Hardware Review: Apple Weighs In With 
Macintosh, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 24, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/24/science/personal-
computers-hardware-review-apple-weighs-in-with-macintosh.html [https://perma.cc/T5VF-62LC] 
(describing the Apple Macintosh computer and providing insight to the early days of personal 
computing). 
 54. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 739. 
 55. Id. at 748 (“Balancing tests provide courts with a high degree of discretion, which can make the 
tests ‘unavoidably vague’ and ‘loosely defined,’ leading to ‘inconsistent results.’”). 
 56. Kissman, supra note 2, at 575 (“Some courts have found that Article 2 directly applies when 
software is sold in the form of a disk or other tangible and moveable medium.”). 
 57. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 748. 
 58. Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 461 
(2000). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Boss, supra note 11, at 176. 
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Displeased, the ALI withdrew early in the process.61 The UCITA’s 
development continued separately from the UCC.62 
 The UCITA attempted to address the software contract problem 
by adjusting the scope of Article 2.63 If the UCITA was adopted, it 
would apply to “computer information transactions.”64 A computer 
information transaction is “an agreement or the performance of it to 
create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or 
informational rights in computer information.”65 Computer 
information is “information in electronic form which is obtained 
from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable 
of being processed by a computer.”66 The UCITA expands the term 
“computer information” to include “a copy of the information and 
any documentation or packaging associated with the copy.”67 
Therefore, if the UCITA was adopted, all software would be removed 
from the scope of Article 2 and be governed by the UCITA.68 
However, the UCITA was widely considered overly complex and 
poorly conceived.69 Additionally, competing interest groups created a 
deadlock in further UCITA adoption.70 
As a result of its wide criticism, only Virginia and Maryland 
adopted the UCITA.71 Since then, Iowa, North Carolina, Vermont, 
and West Virginia actually adopted anti-UCITA legislation,72 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Daniel Uhlfelder, UCITA: Coming to a Statehouse Near You, UBIQUITY (Nov. 30, 2000), 
http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=355133 [https://perma.cc/EA8Q-79JR]. Several years in a row, 
the ALI refused to put the UCITA on the agenda for approval at its annual meetings. Boss, supra note 
11, at 177. The ALI decided to take no final action because of concerns about the architecture and scope 
of the proposal. Id. The ALI was also concerned about its overall coherence and clarity. Id. 
 62. Boss, supra note 11, at 177. 
 63. Scott, supra note 11, at 1013. 
 64. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 65. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(11). 
 66. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(10). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Henning, supra note 11, at 136 (“Going into 1999, Articles 2 and 2B had complementary scope 
provisions; that is, products outside the scope of Article 2 were within the scope of Article 2B, and vice 
versa.”). 
 69. Boss, supra note 11, at 199 (“Its sheer length and complexity makes UCITA a difficult act to 
understand, even for those who are familiar with its provisions.”). 
 70. Scott, supra note 11, at 1050 n.129. 
 71. Goldman, supra note 3. 
 72. Boss, supra note 11, at 175 n.19. 
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nullifying any choice of law provisions applying the UCITA.73 In 
2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws announced that it would no longer seek further adoptions of the 
UCITA.74 As a result, there is no national consensus on whether 
software is a good or a service.75 Software’s legal status remains a 
fundamental, yet unanswered, question.76 
C.   The Dawn of the Smart Good 
In recent years, a new layer of ambiguity has emerged in the world 
of hybrid contracts. The distinction between good and service 
continues to blur as technology develops.77 Today, goods can have 
integrated software78 and services.79 Some goods now have software 
embedded in them; these types of goods are known as “smart 
goods.”80 Examples include a car with a computer chip controlling its 
automatic braking system81 and a printer with integrated software.82 
The classic hybrid tests of years past are becoming less capable of 
classifying modern goods.83 The classification of goods has a huge 
impact on the remedies available to the injured party.84 As goods 
become smarter, “new thinking is needed and lines will need to be 
drawn to determine how to treat the goods containing . . . embedded 
software.”85 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Henning, supra note 11, at 136. 
 75. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet Of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and 
Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016). Amazon sells a product called the Amazon Dash. Id. The 
only function of the button is to reorder a product when pressed using Amazon’s Dash Replenishment 
Service. Id. Without the service, the Dash is useless. Id. 
 80. Braucher, supra note 8, at 241. 
 81. Boss, supra note 11, at 187 n.54. 
 82. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 496. 
 83. See Goldman, supra note 3. 
 84. Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COMPUTER TECH. 
& L.J. 1, 2 (1979). The author states “at this time no one knows for certain what law would govern a 
contract for a computer program.” Id. She then examines the importance of this question in light of the 
different remedies available depending on whether Article 2 of the UCC applies. Id. 
 85. Towle, supra note 10, at 558. 
9
Williams: Not So Good: The Classification of “Smart Goods” Under UCC Articl
Published by Reading Room, 2018
462 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
II.   Analysis 
The theoretical classification of a smart good has a huge impact on 
the consumer.86 The source of this effect is largely due to the nature 
of the UCC,87 which conceptualizes contracts differently than 
traditional common law.88 The common law of contracts, which 
invokes the principle of caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware,” 
provides little support to an unwitting consumer.89 The UCC dispels 
this mentality and builds in a number of protections for a customer 
dealing with a merchant.90 For example, instead of the principle of 
caveat emptor, Article 2 creates several implied warranties 
enforceable in every contract for the sale of goods.91 
One of these warranties is the implied warranty of 
merchantability,92 which guarantees that a consumer’s purchased 
good will “pass without objection in the trade”93 and is “fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which [it is] used.”94 Thus, under Article 2, a 
customer may recover damages from a manufacturer if the good is 
defective, even if the contract never assured the customer of its 
quality.95 Under Article 2, these remedies include the difference in 
value, personal injury, and property damage proximately resulting 
from the breach of implied warranty.96 This is in stark contrast to the 
common law of contracts, where the customer is left to fend for 
himself during contract negotiations.97 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Nycum, supra note 84, at 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Kissman, supra note 2, at 580; Caveat Emptor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 90. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 91. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 (creating, respectively, the implied warranty of 
merchantability, the implied warranty for fitness for a particular purpose, and establishing the ways a 
merchant may disclaim such warranties). Despite these implied warranties imposed on a merchant, it 
may still disclaim those warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316. Instead of the burden resting on the customer to 
insist on a warranty being created, this code scheme simply shifts the burden to the merchant. Id. 
 92. See U.C.C. § 2-314. 
 93. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (“(2) Goods, to be merchantable, must be at least such as: (a) pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description . . . .”). 
 94. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (“(2) Goods, to be merchantable, must be at least such as: . . . (c) are fit for 
the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used . . . .”). 
 95. See U.C.C. § 2-314. 
 96. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2); Nycum, supra note 84, at 3. 
 97. See Bryan Hoynak, Filling in the Blank: Defining Breaches of Contract Excepted from 
10
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Additionally, Article 2 allows parties without privity to sue a party 
for damages resulting from a breach of implied warranty.98 Unlike 
the common law of contracts, which requires some contractual 
relationship to maintain a lawsuit,99 Article 2 creates potential 
                                                                                                                 
Discharge as Willful and Malicious Injuries to Property Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 693, 700–01 (2010) (“The focus in contract law is on the promise that arises out of the 
agreements between the contracting parties, whereas the focus in tort law is on the wrongs that result 
from violations of court-created rules.”). One of the oldest examples of the principle of caveat emptor is 
in Laidlaw v. Organ. In that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic 
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and 
which was exclusively within the knowledge of the seller, ought to have 
been communicated to the buyer? . . . The court is of the opinion that he 
was not bound to communicate it. 
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S 178, 195 (1817). From there, contract law continued to allow sellers to not 
disclose defects, as long as they did not lie to the buyer. Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 
840 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 2007). In Simone v. Homecheck, a modern case concerning ordinary 
contract law in the sale of land, the court stated: 
New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability 
on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when 
the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of 
the seller which constitutes active concealment . . . . The mere silence of 
the seller, without some act or conduct which deceived the buyer, does not 
amount to concealment that is actionable as fraud . . . . To maintain a cause 
of action to recover damages for active concealment in the context of a 
fraudulent nondisclosure, the buyer must show, in effect, that the seller 
thwarted the buyer’s efforts to fulfill the buyer’s responsibilities fixed by 
the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
Id. (holding that numerous structural and material defects in a home purchased by the plaintiffs could 
not constitute a basis for action or damages by the buyer). This mentality is the opposite of the 
protective scheme in the UCC, where the defect itself creates the liability for the merchant seller. The 
seller need not say anything to be liable for his defective sale. The Official Comments of § 2-314 state: 
The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on the meaning 
of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods delivered 
under an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade must be of 
a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in that line of trade under 
the description or other designation of the goods used in the agreement. 
The responsibility imposed rests on any merchant-seller. 
U.C.C. § 2-314 (Official Comment 2). 
 98. U.C.C. § 2-318. There are two types of privity: horizontal privity and vertical privity. 3 MARY 
ANNE FORAN, WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-10, at 350 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON SALES]. 
To maintain a suit under breach of implied warranty of merchantability through vertical privity, all that 
is required is that the party suing is the intended beneficiary of the implied warranty. U.C.C. § 2-318 
(Official Comment 2). In practice, most customers who use the goods for their ordinary purpose are 
intended beneficiaries of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. Accordingly, the ability to sue 
really turns on horizontal privity. WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-10, at 351. Horizontal privity defines how 
closely the injured party must be related to the purchaser of the defective good. Id. The UCC allows 
states to have discretion in this area, defining three alternatives that fall along the continuum from close 
relative to absolute stranger. Id. at 341. 
 99. See Hoynak, supra note 97, at 700–01. 
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manufacturer liability for most consumers of consumer goods.100 For 
example, a spouse injured by a defective product that her husband 
bought from an electronics store could sue the manufacturer for a 
breach of warranty. This dynamic is absent in the common law of 
contracts, which seeks only to make injured parties to the contract 
whole;101 contract law is compensatory, not punitive.102 Therefore, 
the classification of smart goods is not a trivial matter. Unfortunately, 
their classification remains ambiguous103 and no past or current 
solution sufficiently addresses this issue.104 
A.   The UCITA: The One that Got Away 
Article 2’s drafters struggled greatly with its scope.105 Initially, the 
drafting committee attempted to broaden Article 2 to cover 
software.106 Eventually though, for political reasons, they abandoned 
these attempts in favor of independent statutory treatment of goods 
and information.107 Article 2 would govern the sale of goods.108 
Article 2B would govern information.109 Unfortunately, Article 2B 
never garnered the necessary approval, was never widely adopted, 
and was abandoned after being spun off into the UCITA.110 
One major issue the UCITA’s drafters faced was the mixed 
transaction.111 Unlike the hybrid contract, which contains a mix of 
goods and services,112 a mixed transaction is one with an element of 
information either embedded in or packaged with the goods.113 
Supporters of the UCITA wanted it to cover the medium or tangible 
                                                                                                                 
 100. U.C.C. § 2-318. 
 101. See Hoynak, supra note 97, at 701–02. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Boss, supra note 11, at 185. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 185–86. 
 110. Id. at 185. 
 111. Boss, supra note 11, at 185. 
 112. BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 113. Boss, supra note 11, at 187. 
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good on which the information was delivered to the customer.114 
Others insisted that smart goods must fall within the scope of Article 
2, not the information-focused UCITA.115 
The UCITA attempted to solve the problem of smart goods when 
the drafters developed it in the late 1990s, well before the problem 
was fully developed.116 Additionally, since Article 2 was approved 
and adopted while Article 2B (UCITA) was abandoned, their scopes 
conflict over smart goods.117 As a result, in the few states that 
adopted the UCITA, courts use the gravamen test to determine which 
law to apply.118 In these states, for mixed transactions, the court 
simply applies either Article 2 or the UCITA, depending on the 
gravamen of the dispute;119 if the dispute is regarding the tangible 
portion of the smart good, the court will apply Article 2, and if the 
dispute is regarding the information part of the good, the court will 
apply the UCITA.120 
This solution is untenable for two reasons: (1) the gravamen test is 
unfit for this use long-term, as discussed below;121 and (2) only two 
states have adopted the UCITA.122 The UCITA is practically dead,123 
and there is little hope for any other states to ratify it.124 Plus, many 
states have enacted legislation to plainly denounce the UCITA.125 
The whole purpose of the UCC is to be uniform.126 Without a 
uniform acceptance of the UCITA and its relationship with Article 
2’s scope, the issue of smart good classification will not be 
resolved.127 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Braucher, supra note 80, at 243; Brennan, supra note 58, at 461. 
 117. Braucher, supra note 80, at 242–43. 
 118. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Towle, supra note 10, at 555; see infra text accompanying notes 161–70. 
 122. Braucher, supra note 80, at 243. 
 123. Boss, supra note 11, at 168. 
 124. Braucher, supra note 80, at 243. 
 125. Goldman, supra note 3. 
 126. Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30. 
 127. Boss, supra note 11, at 187–88. 
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B.   The Common Law: What We Are Stuck With 
Courts originally developed the tests mentioned above to deal with 
contracts involving a mix of goods and services.128 For example, if a 
customer contracted with a builder to install a diving board for his 
pool, the diving board on its own would be within the scope of 
Article 2, but the service of its installation would not.129 After the 
failure of the UCITA, courts have continued to use the preexisting 
tests for determining whether the smart good in question falls within 
the scope of Article 2.130 
1.   The Predominant Factor Test 
The majority of courts apply the predominant factor test.131 
Traditionally, courts used this test to determine whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–62. 
 129. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 439, 441 (Md. 1983). Discussing Article 2, the 
court stated: 
 Were the predominant purpose test mechanically to be applied to 
the facts of this case, there would be no quality warranty implied as to the 
diving board. But here the contract expressly states that [seller] agrees not 
only to construct the swimming pool, but also to sell the related equipment 
selected by the [buyer]. The [buyer is] described as “Buyer.” The diving 
board itself is not structurally integrated into the swimming pool. [Seller] 
offered the board as an optional accessory, just as [seller] offered the 
options of purchasing a pool ladder or a sliding board. When identified to 
the contract, the diving board was movable . . . . A number of 
commentators have advocated a more policy oriented approach to 
determining whether warranties of quality and fitness are implied with 
respect to goods sold as part of a hybrid transaction in which service 
predominates. To support their position, these commentators in general 
emphasize loss shifting, risk distribution, consumer reliance and difficulties 
in the proof of negligence. These concepts underlie strict liability in tort 
. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Accordingly we hold that where, as part of a commercial 
transaction, consumer goods are sold which retain their character as 
consumer goods after completion of the performance promised to the 
consumer, and where monetary loss or personal injury is claimed to have 
resulted from a defect in the consumer goods, the [UCC sections] dealing 
with implied warranties apply to the consumer goods, even if the 
transaction is predominately one for the rendering of consumer services. 
Id. 
 130. See Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, How the UCC Is Applied to Software Contracts, L. 
TECH. NEWS, Mar. 9, 2011, at *1. 
 131. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
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predominant purpose of the transaction was services or goods.132 
When the sale of a good was the dominant purpose and labor was 
incidentally involved, the court applying this test would hold that the 
entire transaction was governed by Article 2.133 
In the early days of this test’s application to software, the main 
focus was on the hardware.134 At the time, customers had to go to a 
store to purchase software applications.135 Software was most 
commonly sold in boxes containing the software on a compact 
disc.136 Once the courts decided that software was primarily tangible, 
due to its medium, executing the predominant factor test led to 
classifying software as a good.137 However, courts never reached a 
consensus on whether software was actually a good.138 For example, 
compare software to the sale of a book.139 If a customer buys a book 
from a bookstore, reads it, and then decides that the story is not up to 
the ordinary standards for that type of book, the customer cannot sue 
under the implied warranty of merchantability.140 The intangible 
content of the book is clearly outside the scope of Article 2.141 
However, if that same customer’s book fell apart while reading it, the 
customer could sue because the tangible good—the book itself—was 
defective.142 Despite this analogy’s clear parallel with software, the 
pressure of public policy143 and the overall novelty of software in the 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Towle, supra note 10, at 556. 
 135. See id. at 545. 
 136. Kissman, supra note 2, at 575. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
 139. Towle, supra note 10, at 556. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The [UCC] offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions 
likely to arise in computer software disputes: implied warranties, 
consequential damages, disclaimers of liability, the statute of limitations, to 
name a few. The importance of software to the commercial world and the 
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong 
policy arguments favoring inclusion [of software within Article 2’s scope]. 
Id. (holding that software is within the scope of Article 2). 
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early days144 compelled courts to consider software within the scope 
of Article 2.145 
Because of this history and the tendency early on to classify 
software as a good, some courts continue to assume Article 2 applies 
to software.146 The issue is even more apparent today with the 
proliferation of software as a service, cloud computing, and smart 
goods.147 Take this hypothetical as an example: a diabetic buys a 
small mobile device containing an application that sends reminders to 
inject insulin.148 If there is an issue with the product, applying the 
predominant factor test to this scenario becomes very difficult 
because of the product’s integrated hardware and software.149 In 
particular, when evaluating the fourth factor of the analysis (the 
nature of the final product delivered), a court might consider the 
small mobile device an Article 2 transaction if the other factors are 
also consistent.150 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Towle, supra note 10, at 556. 
 145. See, e.g., Advent Systems Ltd., 925 F.2d at 674. The court in Advent stated: 
 Because software was a major portion of the “products” described 
in the agreement, this matter requires some discussion. Computer systems 
consist of “hardware” and “software.” Hardware is the computer 
machinery, its electronic circuitry and peripheral items such as keyboards, 
readers, scanners and printers. Software is a more elusive concept. 
Generally speaking, “software” refers to the medium that stores input and 
output data as well as computer programs. The medium includes hard 
disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tapes. 
 In simplistic terms, programs are codes prepared by a programmer 
that instruct the computer to perform certain functions. When the program 
is transposed onto a medium compatible with the computer’s needs, it 
becomes software . . . . 
 The increasing frequency of computer products as subjects of 
commercial litigation has led to controversy over whether software is a 
“good” or intellectual property . . . . 
 . . . . 
 The importance of software to the commercial world and the 
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong 
policy arguments favoring inclusion. The contrary arguments are not 
persuasive, and we hold that software is a “good” within the definition of 
the Code. 
Id. at 674–76. 
 146. Towle, supra note 10, at 556. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 557. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 745. 
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The obvious criticism of this test is that by applying either the 
UCC or common law to the entire contract, at least some subject 
matter of the mixed transaction will be governed by the wrong law.151 
Using the diabetic device example, the predominant factor test would 
force the court to apply Article 2 to the entire transaction, including 
the software and the insulin reminder software.152 
As goods become smarter, continued use of the predominant factor 
test will lead to “pretty awful results.”153 In some cases, the 
application of Article 2 to software will often result in the violation 
of federal law.154 Additionally, Article 2’s default warranty rules are 
not adequately suited for the complexities of software.155 Because 
Article 2 was drafted before software was commonplace and has not 
been substantially amended since, applying Article 2—through the 
use of the predominant factor test—will result in applying a law the 
does not adequately account for the nature of software.156 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id.; see also Towle, supra note 10, at 558. 
 152. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. 
 153. Towle, supra note 10, at 558. Towle states: 
 As goods become “smarter” with included digital, genetic, or other 
licensed information, new thinking is needed and lines will need to be 
drawn to determine how to treat goods containing that information, 
including embedded software. Use of a predominant purpose test will 
inherently mislead, or eventually lead, to the “pretty awful results” . . . if 
used to sweep information into UCC Article 2. Not surprisingly, the fact 
that the revisions drafted in the 1990s for UCC Article 2 codified a 
predominant purpose test was one of the reasons the revisions drew sharp 
criticism. More appropriate gravamen of the action lines have already been 
drawn for some modern circumstances, and more will develop over time 
. . . . 
 There are important differences that exist between goods and 
information in law, practice, under intellectual property laws and even 
under the First Amendment. Given those differences, a court fashioning the 
resolution of a dispute should not simply apply Article 2 by analogy or 
under a predominant purpose test, but rather should consider the issue . . . . 
Id. at 558–59. 
 154. Id. at 559. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 745–46. 
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2.   The Gravamen Test 
The minority of jurisdictions apply the gravamen test, including 
those that have adopted the UCITA.157 The gravamen test addresses 
many of the concerns produced by the continued use of the 
predominant factor test.158 Unlike the predominant factor test, which 
applies one body of law based upon the analysis of factors,159 the 
gravamen test applies law based on the subject matter of the 
dispute.160 For example, a diabetic buys the device described in the 
example above, the software reminder malfunctions, and the diabetic 
is injured because he did not take his insulin. When the diabetic sues 
for the software malfunction, the court can easily avoid Article 2 by 
identifying the dispute as one of an intangible or service-based 
nature.161 
The gravamen of the dispute, however, will become more difficult 
to identify as “technologies [continue to become] increasingly 
intertwined.”162 The court may have trouble determining if the 
software’s failure to deliver the insulin reminder was in fact caused 
by a hardware defect. If the software failure was caused by a 
hardware defect, the diabetic should be entitled to sue under breach 
of implied warranty of merchantability.163 However, it could be hard 
for courts to determine whether the gravamen of the dispute is the 
good or the embedded software or service. It is “becoming 
increasingly difficult to draw a clear distinction . . . even for 
computer scientists.”164 The gravamen test is a tool courts developed 
to classify hybrid contracts where the distinction between good and 
service was much clearer.165 Accordingly, “new thinking is 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 158. Id. 
 159. BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 160. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 473 n.49. 
 164. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571. 
 165. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 473. 
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needed . . . to determine how to treat the goods 
containing . . . embedded software.”166 
III.   Proposal 
All current solutions fail because they are retrofitted to the issue. 
Smart goods emerged after the tests and doctrines around the hybrid 
contract were formed and settled.167 Courts still struggle to use these 
ill-suited tools to accomplish the task of classifying smart goods.168 
The solution to this problem should be developed with a conscious 
consideration of smart goods, not mere application after-the-fact. The 
predominant factor test fails at this task primarily because it applies 
one body of law to the entire contract, even if parts of the contract are 
clearly outside the scope of Article 2.169 The gravamen test fails at 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Towle, supra note 10, at 558. 
 167. ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–64. 
 168. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–72. Kissman describes the issue: 
Courts face [a dilemma] when dealing with mixed transactions that involve 
goods and services. To determine the source of law that applies to these 
mixed transactions, courts have developed different tests . . . Some 
[commentators argue that the gravamen test] is more reasonable for 
information transactions, and that the predominant purpose test renders 
awkward results when applied to information transactions. On the other 
hand, because emerging technologies have become increasingly 
intertwined, some authors point out that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between embedded and non-embedded 
software, even for computer scientists . . . . [J]ust as the definition of 
“information” can determine the applicable law, the mixed transaction test 
that a court decides to apply can also have a significant impact on the 
source of law that will govern a transaction, and thus the contractual rights 
of the parties. 
Id. at 571–72. 
 169. Towle, supra note 10, at 555. Towle writes: 
The predominant purpose test is a judge-made rule and is the approach that 
most courts use when a transaction involves a mixed subject matter—
typically a mixture of goods and services. The test holds that the court 
should apply the contract law applicable to the subject matter that forms the 
predominant purpose of the transaction and apply that contract law to the 
entire transaction. The approach ensures that the intellectually wrong 
contract law will apply to at least some of the subject matter of a mixed 
transaction . . . . It is inappropriate for information transactions. In fact, 
initial use of this test in software transactions contributed to the problem 
that exists today—using the presence of a good in a transaction to subsume 
all items even though some cry out for individual treatment. 
Id. at 555–56. 
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this task primarily because the actual “gravamen” of the dispute may 
be impossible to determine.170 In some instances, the software might 
have caused a malfunction in a tangible good; in other instances, the 
hardware of the tangible good may have contributed to a software 
malfunction. An easily-applied solution should address the failings of 
these traditional tests to remove the ambiguity surrounding smart 
good classification. 
A.   The Solution 
The proposed solution has three steps. First, the court must 
determine if the good in question is a smart good. If the good is not 
“smart” or if there is no “good” component, then the court simply 
applies either common law or Article 2 respectively. Second, if the 
good is smart, and the litigation does not concern breach of warranty, 
the smart good will be deemed inside the scope of Article 2. Third, 
for litigation around a breach of warranty of a smart good, the court 
will assess the practical effect of the defect. If the practical effect is 
tangible, the smart good will be deemed inside the scope of Article 2. 
1.   Step One: Is It Smart? 
The first step of the solution is the easiest to apply and the most 
obvious. A smart good, for this solution, will be any tangible good 
ordinarily within the scope of Article 2 containing some intangible 
functionality which, taken alone, would be outside the scope of 
Article 2. If the good is deemed a smart good, the analysis continues 
to the next step. If the good is not smart, the inquiry ends, and Article 
2 applies automatically. 
2.   Step Two: Is It Defective? 
The second step addresses several issues inherent in the 
predominant factor test. If the litigation is not for breach of warranty, 
the smart good is automatically deemed within the scope of Article 2, 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71. 
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despite the presence of embedded software. One major problem with 
the predominant factor test is forcing the court to determine what was 
actually bargained for.171 This is a complex endeavor when a smart 
good’s software is just as important to the bargain as the hardware. 
For example, a customer contracts to buy a smart good but the seller 
never delivers. That simple breach of contract suit does not 
necessitate the predominant factor analysis. The smart good is 
powered off and in the box. The presence of embedded software 
makes no difference. The UCC’s remedies for a buyer in the event of 
a seller’s breach easily apply. For all breaches of contract, other than 
those concerning functionality, the presence of embedded software 
makes no difference. Article 2 should apply in those cases as though 
the good was not smart. 
3.   Step Three: Is the Defect Tangible? 
Step three addresses litigation concerning the smart good’s 
functionality. The key concern is avoiding the application of the UCC 
to issues it was never meant to govern. Article 2 was not designed to 
provide remedies and warranties to contracts for intangibles.172 
Article 2’s scope provision expressly limits the scope to things that 
are “movable.”173 Labor, services, and modern software are settled as 
being outside of Article 2’s scope.174 However, issues can arise with 
the application of UCC Article 2 to modern smart goods containing 
integrated software—for example, when the software in a refrigerator 
makes it stop refrigerating. This issue is what the gravamen test tries 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. Gottlieb writes: 
Courts routinely apply the predominant purpose test to software contracts 
to determine if the UCC applies. Under that test, Article 2 governs when 
the transaction at issue is predominantly for goods, while common law 
applies when the transaction is predominantly for services. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has yet to rule whether software is a good or service, and 
“there is no national consensus” on the issue. And yet despite its 
prevalence, the predominant purpose test has failed to assist courts in 
adjudicating software contract disputes. As a result, software’s legal status 
remains a fundamental yet unanswered question. 
Id. 
 172. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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but fails to address.175 It is often unclear and very difficult to 
determine what exactly caused the breach of warranty in a 
litigation.176 Accordingly, step three of the analysis shifts the inquiry 
from what caused the litigation to the actual litigated defect. This is a 
subtle but important shift. Under this analysis, if the defect manifests 
itself tangibly, then Article 2 applies. “Tangible” keeps its standard 
definition: a thing that is perceptible by touch. This standard is easier 
to apply than the gravamen test. Under the gravamen test, the court 
endeavors to determine the cause of the litigation, its gravamen,177 
which can be difficult “even for computer scientists.”178 Instead, this 
test simply asks if the defect manifested itself tangibly. Even if the 
defect originated in the software, a tangible manifestation will thrust 
the contract into the scope of Article 2. If a hardware defect causes a 
software malfunction or a software defect causes a software 
malfunction, Article 2 will not apply to the litigation. 
A basic example to illustrate this distinction is a refrigerator with 
an embedded software operating system. Suppose a customer comes 
home and realizes that his refrigerator stopped refrigerating. Under 
the gravamen test, the court would endeavor to determine if the 
defect was caused by the hardware or software.179 This could be 
impossible to determine.180 And if the refrigeration ceased because of 
a software defect, the court would not apply Article 2,181 despite its 
clear effect on the function of the tangible good. Instead, under this 
test, the court would not need to determine the root cause of the 
malfunction. Regardless, whether the malfunction arose from the 
hardware or software, the failure to refrigerate is a tangible 
malfunction and should be governed by the implied warranties and 
remedies available under Article 2. However, if the refrigerator 
suddenly lost its ability to connect to the internet or post tweets, that 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Towle, supra note 10, at 558. 
 176. Id. at 556. 
 177. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71. 
 178. Id. at 571. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 572. 
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intangible malfunction—whether caused by hardware or software—
should not be governed by Article 2. 
The downside to this approach is that some hardware defects might 
render a smart good useless if the defect is manifested as a software 
malfunction. Some flawed circuitry, for example, would not be 
covered under Article 2 if it impaired the software’s ability to 
connect to the internet. In this particular example, the tangible part of 
the good is causing an intangible malfunction. However, this is a 
necessary downside for the overall clarity and consistency of this 
approach. The whole purpose of the proposed solution is to avoid the 
inquiry into what actually caused the defect. Because Article 2 of the 
UCC was designed to provide warranties over defects of tangible 
goods,182 that implicitly means that Article 2 was not meant to 
address intangible defects. This will be less of a problem as 
“technologies [continue to become] increasingly intertwined”183 and 
the true cause of a smart good malfunction becomes increasingly 
obfuscated. By limiting the tangible defect standard to only 
litigations involving breach of warranty, ensuring Article 2 protection 
for all other smart goods, the number of cases affected by this 
apparent inconsistency will be much lower than with current 
solutions. 
B.   The Implementation 
The solution outlined above is restricted to the classification of 
smart goods under Article 2. Therefore, it leaves open the possibility 
of a future body of law to replace the ill-fated UCITA governing 
information transactions. This solution also does not conflict with 
any pre-existing or future software licensing law. Instead, the only 
time Article 2 will govern a defect in information is when that defect 
manifests itself in a tangible way that entitles the customer to an 
Article 2 breach of warranty cause of action. 
However, implementing this solution could prove challenging. The 
most direct way of implementing this solution is to amend Article 2’s 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1), 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 183. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71. 
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scope provision to include smart goods. Then, in the breach of 
warranty provisions, the application of smart goods should be limited 
to cases of manifested tangible defects. The official comments would 
then describe the analysis for the court. 
The challenge of this implementation is that the UCC is not black 
letter law. The UCC provisions only become law once the states 
adopt them.184 As with the UCITA, it is possible that only a few 
states, or none at all, would adopt these modified provisions. 
However, if the solution could make it past the scrutiny of the ALI 
and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—a feat the UCITA was 
unable to achieve185—the states would likely adopt the changes. 
Individual states could implement their own adaptations of Article 
2 including the altered smart good scope and warranty provisions. 
However, this implementation is less desirable for two reasons. First, 
the goal of the UCC is to provide a uniform set of regulations for the 
sale of goods.186 If states start haphazardly implementing a tweaked 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 594. 
 185. Henning, supra note 11, at 135–36. Henning writes: 
The [group of drafters] came tantalizingly close [to ratifying the UCITA]. 
[At the drafters’ annual meeting in 1999, the drafters were] inundated with 
letters of objection, primarily from industry stakeholders. There was even a 
full page ad in USA Today urging that the draft be rejected. The floor 
debate began after a long and difficult debate over UCITA, and it 
consumed so much time that it threatened to derail other important projects. 
As it was apparent that even if the debate continued it would not produce a 
product that could successfully gain widespread enactment, NCCUSL’s 
leadership, in consultation with the leadership of the ALI, made the 
controversial decision to stop the debate. [UCITA’s scope issues could 
never be resolved and the UCITA ultimately died.] 
Id. 
 186. Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30. Malcolm writes: 
One problem is the disparity among the laws . . . uniformity or harmony 
would permit business and society to function more easily. It is against this 
general background that a report on a major effort of unification of the law 
in the United States culminating in the production of the new Uniform 
Commercial Code may be found timely. The Uniform Commercial Code, 
hammered out by lawyers, judges and law teachers dedicated to clarity and 
good business sense in commercial law, has brought together into one 
coherent statement the best laws and practices prevalent in the United 
States. Both the procedures by which this Code was developed and the 
contents of the Code which, it is hoped, will soon be the law in all states of 
the Union . . . . 
Id. at 226–27. 
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definition of Article 2’s scope, fragmentation and unpredictability 
would spread across the nation. Second, although many states often 
tweak the ULC and ALI sanctioned versions, the issue of smart 
goods is very complex. It would be prudent for states to let a solution 
pass through the scrutiny of the ALI before implementing their own 
individual, complex solutions. Finally, implementing individual state 
adaptations would require courts to ignore or overturn precedent. 
Even if they tried, there would be no uniformity within a state unless 
the state’s supreme court issued a ruling establishing this solution. 
Even then, fragmentation among the states would still persist. 
Therefore, an amended Article 2, vetted by the ALI and adopted by 
the states, is the best way to implement this solution. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars were aware in the 1990s that transactions in 
information would grow in popularity. Even during the drafting of 
the UCITA, scholars hotly debated the classification of a theoretical 
smart good. Unfortunately, although Article 2 and Article 2B were to 
complement each other, Article 2B (UCITA) never garnered the 
necessary support. Article 2 forged ahead alone, with the 
classification of smart goods never resolved. The line between 
software and hardware continues to blur. The common law 
approaches used to fill the void left by the failed UCITA in resolving 
smart good classification grow evermore antiquated. 
This Note proposes that courts perform a three-part test when 
determining whether UCC Article 2 applies to a smart good. First, 
Article 2 shall apply to any smart good in a litigation for anything 
other than breach of warranty. Second, if the cause of action is breach 
of warranty, whether expressed or implied, the body of law which 
shall apply to the contract will be Article 2. Third, Article 2 will only 
apply if the alleged nonconformity is a tangible defect. 
Article 2 can provide implied warranties and remedies to 
customers injured by tangible defects. It is only when the defect is 
intangible that the controversy leaves the scope of Article 2. If this 
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proposal passes the scrutiny of the ALI and the ULC and is uniformly 
adopted by states, the ambiguity will finally be resolved, and the door 
will remain open for a comprehensive body of law to finish what the 
UCITA never could. 
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